


Public and private standards/norms and (toxic) pesticide use reduction in tropical agriculture.

What does the social and political sciences
scholarship tells us

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

Introduction



- Tropical agriculture: great variety of countries with their own pesticide regulatory systems and national regulations
- Some countries member of regional agreements, for instance « Le comité sahélien des pesticides » (the body in charge of the implementation of the Common regulation of the CILSS Member States for the registration of pesticides)
- Part of a series of international/global agreements (Rotterdam Convention; Stockholm Convention etc.) and voluntary schemes (The FAO International Code of Conduct on Pesticide Management)
- Variety of private standards: retailers / commodities / pesticide industry; corporate social responsibility; environmental related => aiming at better management of pesticide uses / prevention of detrimental effects

Introduction

Scholarship in political and social sciences on pesticides reduction in tropical countries has been dealing with



- National regulatory systems
- Influence of « global north » regulatory systems
- International agreements and voluntary schemes (how they have been developed; their properties; less about how they have been implemented and their effects at national levels)
- Analysis of the implementation of some public and private standards and their effects (at national levels)
- Analysis of conflicts/controversies on regulation (including conflicts between pesticide industry groups)

The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade: Some Legal Notes

Ted L. McDorman

First published: 17 June 2004 | <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9388.2004.00396.x> | Citations: 5

Governance of agro-pesticide through private environmental and social standards in the global cut flower chain from Ethiopia

Belay T. Mengistie, Arthur P. J. Mol, Peter Oosterveer

Business Conflict and Risk Regulation: Understanding the Influence of the Pesticide Industry

Kees Jansen

> Author and Article Information

Global Environmental Politics (2017) 17 (4): 48–66.

1 - The problem of capacity

RAYMOND HILL*

Problems and Policy for Pesticide Exports To Less Developed Countries**

Pesticides are an ideal product: like heroin, they promise paradise and deliver addiction.
[Paul R. Ehrlich, 1978]

Title

Poisoning the Developing World: The Exportation of Unregistered and Severely Restricted Pesticides from the United States

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7c287495>

Journal

UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, 13(2)


- Proxy « developing countries »

- 25% of developing countries lack any type of legislation to govern the distribution and use of pesticides;
- 80% lack the capacity (essentially the manpower and financial resources) to enforce legislation;
- 60% do not have the facilities to verify and control the quality of pesticides, and most do not have systems in place to adequately handle the importation of banned or restricted compounds; ([Schaerers \(1996\)](#); [Mengistie \(2016\)](#))

- Consequences

- 30% of the pesticides used do not meet internationally recognized safety standards ([WHO, 2009](#))
- Import of pesticides banned in richer countries (including PAN highly hazardous listed pesticides)
- Easiness to import unauthorized pesticides
- Overuse and imports in excess of needs (=> obsolete pesticides)

1- The Problem of Capacity dealt in international arenas from 1980s



- « Safe use » approach related « Good Agricultural Practice » concept – industry promoted - a failure ([Murray 1995](#)) but still very pervasive.
- to « reduction/suppression of hazards » (Ban) as an overall approach – centred on “highly hazardous pesticides”
- Many initiatives from NGOs, Private Sectors, States, International organisations
- PIC procedure (Prior Informed Consent) – Rotterdam Convention
- **Many limits:**
 - Do not resolve the capacity problem (even though uneven and improvements in some countries)
 - Limited list of products concerned (negotiation process takes time)

2 – Example of Q-GAP a public standard in Thailand


- Response to the chronic overuse and misuse of pesticides => reduce potential food hazards and increase the image of Thai horticultural/agricultural products abroad.
- Krause et al. 2016: 1) The orchid and mango producers with higher education, and more physical and social capital who tend to comply with Q-GAP standards ; 2) positive income effects for mango producers, but not for orchid producers.
- Montano et al. 2017: Study of Aspargus farmers. 1) No economic advantage of being certified. 2) GAP resulted in no reduction in the intensity of pesticide use. (no viable alternative; efforts to control only before harvesting to limit residues).
- Schreinemachers et al. 2012: 1) Quantitative farm-level analysis => GAP certified fruit and vegetable farmers = no reduction in the use of (hazardous) pesticides. Qualitative analysis of litchi producers practices => poor implementation of farm auditing ; lack of understanding of how the standard works ; lack of alternatives given to farmers to manage their pest problems ; GAP program focuses on residues levels (consequences, not the causes).

3 – Exemple of GobalGAP (Retailer standards) in Chile (Bain 2010)

- The expansion of global value chains = the growth of labor markets that are both flexible and feminized
- *“How are social relations within the labor market constructed? Markets and their institutional arrangements, such as labor standards, are neither passive nor benign processes that simply reflect preexisting social relations ?”*
- GlobalGAP created in 2001 by a set of influential British and European retailers
- GlobalGAP standards for worker health, safety, and welfare act to (re)shape and (re)structure the flexible and feminized labor market within the Chilean fresh fruit export sector => historical rise in feminized labor in Chile.
- GAP standards to deal with pesticide poisoning only to small segment of workers (full-time, permanent = male) => reinforcement of subcontracting (=flexible labor) => over exposure of women.
- Retailers benefit from this structural reinforcement of inequality

3 – Exemple of Environmental standards in Banana (Honduras) (Jansen 2004)

- Examine the idea that self-regulation = principal win-win solution for sustainable development vs as green wash
- Efforts of two banana companies Chiquita and Dole to bring a certified green banana on the market in response to harsh criticisme => compare the process of certification, auditing and restructuring of banana production
- Nature of technological change and the nature of the chosen alliances with certification agencies
- Each company chose a different standard (eg. that fit best with their pest management system and their market strategies/relationship)
- Adoption of environmental standards did not affect the overall culture of spraying but changed some of the spraying activities
- **Health and safety of farmworkers only improved marginally**



Conclusion

- Public and private standards / normes reflect the strong imbalance between the so-called « global north » and « global south » and the structural injustice and imbalance of power along the global value chain.
- Problem of capacity
- Standards/norms responses to critic / activism
- Their development and implementation are accompanied by multi-level changes (technical, organisational, economic, legal...)
- Limited positive effects on the uses of (hazardous) pesticides, pollution, worker and neighborhood health